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COMMENT
INTERGENERATIONAL CONTROL: WHY
GENETIC MODIFICATION OF EMBRYOS VIA
CRISPR-CAS9 IS NOT A FUNDAMENTAL
PARENTAL RIGHT
FERNANDO MONTOYA*
In 2012, a momentous scientific breakthrough occurred in the field of genetic
editing: the discovery of CRISPR-Cas9. This new technique allows scientists to edit
the human genome more rapidly, cheaply, and precisely than ever before. Researchers
now have the potential to cure illnesses like cancer, ALS, and Alzheimer’s disease.
CRISPR not only provides a mechanism for curing people currently suffering from
a disease, but it establishes a manner in which an embryo’s DNA can be modified to
prevent any future generation from inheriting that disease. Because using CRISPR
to alter the human genome presents irreversible intergenerational consequences for
the human gene pool—and given the appealing nature of the technology to change
a child’s future from the womb—this Comment considers whether parents have a
fundamental constitutional right to use CRISPR to edit their child’s DNA.
This Comment argues that the right to permanently modify an embryo’s DNA, and
consequently alter future generations’ genetic make-up, via CRISPR significantly
deviates from Supreme Court precedent. Because the right to use CRISPR modifications
is not engrained in the minds of people or traditions of society, it does not qualify as a
* Junior Staff Member, American University Law Review, Volume 69; J.D.
Candidate, May 2021, American University Washington College of Law; B.S., Political
Science and History, 2014, Illinois State University. I would like to thank Professor
Robert Dinerstein for his invaluable feedback and the Law Review staff for their diligent
work in editing this piece for publication. I would also like to thank Erin Downey,
Connie Potter, and Nora Clifford for their extensive contributions during the editorial
process. Finally, I am eternally grateful to my friends, family, and the Murphys for their
constant support and encouragement throughout my law school career.
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fundamental right and is not subject to a strict scrutiny standard. Moreover, the Court
has also held that a “special weight” should be given to parents in regard to visitation
and child-rearing decisions, effectively ruling out the application of a rational basis
standard. Therefore, intermediate scrutiny is a more appropriate test for courts to apply
in cases regarding parents’ constitutional rights of CRISPR’s use to genetically modify
embryos. An intermediate scrutiny standard allows for the most flexible standard when
making decisions that will have enduring repercussion on our species.
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History repeats, but science reverberates.
—Siddhartha Mukherjee1
INTRODUCTION
Imagine having the ability to manipulate your child’s genetic makeup to change her eye color, raise her intelligence, or permanently rid
her of a disease to which she was predisposed—all before she was born.
While genetic modification of this kind historically seemed implausible,
it recently gained monumental traction and “marked the beginning of
a new era for biology.”2 For the first time in human history, in 2018, a
scientist used a genetic modification technique called Clustered
Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR-Cas9)3 to
create two young and healthy girls, Lulu and Nana.4 The twin girls’
father was HIV-positive; however, while Lulu and Nana were a single
cell, scientists were able to remove “the doorway through which HIV
enter[s] to infect people.”5
1. SIDDHARTHA MUKHERJEE, THE EMPEROR OF ALL MALADIES: A BIOGRAPHY OF
CANCER 466 (2010).
2. How Does Genome Editing Work?, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/policy-issues/Genome-Editing/Howgenome-editing-works [https://perma.cc/FX4K-8S7L] (last updated Aug. 3, 2017);
Patrick D. Hsu et al., Development & Applications of CRISPR-Cas9 for Genome Engineering,
157 CELL 1262, 1262 (2014).
3. All references to CRISPR in this Comment refer specifically to CRISPR-Cas9.
The CRISPR technique is regularly associated with the Cas9 protein and is formally
referred to as “CRISPR-Cas9.” Sarah Nelson, Co-Creator of CRISPR Lectures About Future
Applications of Genome Editing Technology, DAILY BRUIN (Nov. 19, 2019, 12:48 AM),
https://dailybruin.com/2019/11/19/co-creator-of-crispr-lectures-about-futureapplications-of-genome-editing-technology [https://perma.cc/GKP8-LBVW].
4. See Rob Stein, Chinese Scientist Says He’s First to Create Genetically Modified Babies
Using CRISPR, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 26, 2018 5:02 AM), https://www.npr.
org/sections/health-shots/2018/11/26/670752865/chinese-scientist-says-hes-first-togenetically-edit-babies [https://perma.cc/6AV6-GC35] (pointing out that the Chinese
researcher, Dr. He, stated “I understand my work will be controversial,” but that “I believe
families need this technology. And I am willing to take the criticism for them”). See
generally Jing-ru Li et al., Experiments that Led to the First Gene-Edited Babies: The Ethical
Failings & the Urgent Need for Better Governance, 20 J. ZHEJIANG UNIV. 32, 32 (2019)
(calling for “[a] more robust system of ethical governance” in China because Dr. He’s
experiment shows that the government cannot keep pace with the rapidly changing
bioethics issues arising from genetic modification).
5. See Stein, supra note 4 (pointing out that the researchers created the viable twin
pregnancy by taking one-day old embryos, editing sixteen of them, and implanting
eleven). Researchers have already begun pushing the boundaries of this technique
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These relatively nascent6 genetic modification technologies allow
scientists to permanently and precisely add, remove, or alter an
organism’s DNA.7 At first, editing techniques were tested and used on
somatic cells—any cells that are neither egg nor sperm cells—and only
resulted in genetic changes that did not carry any intergenerational
implications.8 However, as scientific methods for editing techniques
progressed, scientists were eventually able to make changes to human
DNA that could be passed to future generations.9 Among those new
technologies was the revolutionary CRISPR,10 with which scientists
could make all desired DNA changes “faster, cheaper, more accurate,
and more efficient” than ever before.11
The significance of CRISPR’s achievements cannot be overstated.
CRISPR was named “Breakthrough of the Year” in 2015 and has the
potential to permanently cure diseases such as, inter alia, human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and some cancers.12 In fact, CRISPR
allowed scientists to create Lulu and Nana by changing “[n]o gene . . .

beyond embryos and are working toward editing human reproductive cells themselves.
Rob Stein, Scientists Attempt Controversial Experiment to Edit DNA in Human Sperm Using
CRISPR, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 22, 2019, 5:04 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
health-shots/2019/08/22/746321083/scientists-attempt-controversial-experiment-toedit-dna-in-human-sperm-using-cri [https://perma.cc/4838-MTZQ] (explaining how
reproductive biologists are attempting to use CRISPR to modify genes in human sperm
to help combat, among other things, male infertility and prostate cancer).
6. See Noah C. Chauvin, Note, Custom-Edited DNA: Legal Limits on the Patentability
of CRISPR-Cas9’s Therapeutic Applications, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 297, 304–05 (2018)
(noting that genome editing techniques have only been in use since 1994).
7. What Are Genome Editing & CRISPR-Cas9?, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED. (Nov. 12,
2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/genomicresearch/genomeediting [https://
perma.cc/R48C-YXEK].
8. Id.; see also ANTHONY J.F. GRIFFITHS ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO GENETIC
ANALYSIS 469 (7th ed. 2000) (explaining that somatic cells by definition “are never
transmitted to progeny” but that germline cells “participate[] in fertilization” and are
“passed on to the next generation”).
9. What Are Genome Editing & CRISPR-Cas9?, supra note 7; see also Rajat M. Gupta
& Kiran Musunuru, Expanding the Genetic Editing Tool Kit: ZFNs, TALENs, and CRISPRCas9, 124 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 4154, 4156, 4159 (2014) (comparing and
contrasting the advantages and disadvantages of Zinc Finger Nucleases (ZFNs),
Transcription activator-like effector nucleases (TALENs), and CRISPR-Cas9).
10. See MARCY E. GALLO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44824, ADVANCED GENE
EDITING: CRISPR-CAS9 1 (2018).
11. What Are Genome Editing & CRISPR-Cas9?, supra note 7.
12. GALLO ET AL., supra note 10, at 1; see also Kelly E. Ormond et al., Human Germline
Genome Editing, 101 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 167, 168 (2017).
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except the one to prevent HIV infection.”13 However, because of the
serious intergenerational implications that come with editing viable
embryos through CRISPR, many, including those under the Obama
Administration, have been wary of accepting widespread, unregulated
use of the technology.14
While no Supreme Court precedent discusses parents’ rights to
genetically modify an embryo’s DNA, the question is likely to come
before the Court in the near future. When the Court addresses this
issue, it will look to its precedents addressing parental rights and
caselaw closely related to those rights.
This Comment argues that human germline genome modification
through CRISPR technology is not a traditionally protected right
under the test that Justice Scalia established in Michael H. v. Gerald D.15
The right to permanently modify an embryo’s DNA, and consequently
future generations’ genetic make-up, is not a fundamental right
subject to strict scrutiny because it differs remarkably from the
fundamental rights to “bear and beget” a child and to raise a child as
one wishes. This Comment goes on to explain why Troxel v. Granville16
effectively overcomes Michael H.’s application of a rational-basis
standard, making intermediate scrutiny the appropriate standard for
courts to apply in cases concerning parents’ constitutional rights to use
CRISPR to genetically modify embryos.
Part I of this Comment provides a scientific background of how DNA
functions and discusses how CRISPR fundamentally changed the field
of genetic editing. Additionally, this Part provides the relevant history
and jurisprudence of caselaw directly related to parental rights and
closely related interests created by the Court.17 Next, Part II of this
Comment analyzes existing Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
rights and shows how CRISPR modification is drastically different from
the current interests that Supreme Court jurisprudence protects. This
Part also shows how Michael H. establishes that germline editing
13. See Stein, supra note 4.
14. John P. Holdren, A Note on Genome Editing, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (May 26, 2015,
10:40 AM) https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/05/26/note-genomeediting [https://perma.cc/Q48G-W5CP] (applauding the National Academy of
Sciences and its National Academy of Medicine for discussing ethical boundaries while
simultaneously reiterating their position that the ethical line into clinical applications
of human germline modification “should not be crossed at this time”).
15. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
16. 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).
17. See infra Section I.
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through CRISPR is likely not a fundamentally protected interest. Part
II also explains how the most recent parental rights case, Troxel, casts
doubt on what standard of review courts should apply to these types of
cases.18 Finally, in Part II, this Comment argues that CRISPR
technology is not a fundamental right protected under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but, because courts will
give some deference to parental decisions under Troxel’s precedent,
intermediate scrutiny is the applicable standard of review.19
I. BACKGROUND
Before exploring Supreme Court caselaw concerning parental
rights, it is essential to comprehend the enormous leap that CRISPR
made in the field of genetic modification. This Part first explains the
basics of DNA function and discusses how the flow of genetic
information dictates how the human body ultimately expresses genes.
Next, this Part briefly discusses the science behind CRISPR technology
and explains the numerous scientific benefits that CRISPR provides
researchers. Finally, this Part explores the promising applications that
CRISPR has on infectious and inherited diseases, heritable and
nonheritable genome modifications, and DNA edits that result in
artificial human enhancement.
A. The Road to CRISPR
A general understanding of DNA functionality provides a useful base
for the science of genetic modification and, in turn, the constitutional
implications that CRISPR would compel the Supreme Court to
consider when weighing in on the breadth of parental rights.
1.

The “Central Dogma”
DNA serves as the instructional code or “blueprint” that tells every
part of a human body how to work properly.20 All the instructional
code contained in a single human body is referred to as a person’s
genome.21 Additionally, DNA serves as the initial step in the flow of

18. See infra Section II.B.
19. See infra Section II.C.
20. See A. JAMIE CUTICCHIA, GENETICS: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS 16 (2d ed. 2018).
21. The human genome, which is made up of about three billion DNA base pairs
and contains everything necessary to help an organism grow and survive, is contained
in almost every single cell in the body. See, e.g., id.; A Brief Guide to Genomics, NAT’L HUM.
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information that helps make ribonucleic acid (RNA),22 which aids in
directing when and how many proteins are created.23 Proteins play an
integral role in the “structure, function, and regulation of the body’s
tissues and organs.”24 This flow of information is “essential for all known
forms of life” and is so integral in the field of molecular biology that it is
often referred to as the “central dogma.”25 Two significant steps comprise
the process of protein creation: transcription and translation.26 Together,
these two steps dictate how a gene is expressed.27
More recently, scientists have discovered new techniques for
modifying the human genome.28 By cutting targeted areas of a DNA’s
code, researchers now have the ability to add, remove, or replace that
DNA sequence with different, more desirable code.29 Consequently,
the slightest modification in a DNA sequence can result in significant
effects on the information flow described above, causing permanent
changes to the overall genome. This extraordinary capability is fairly
new to the biotechnological community, and its development—while
swift—has gone through many different iterations, ultimately leading
to the discovery of the CRISPR system.30
GENOME RES. INST., https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/A-BriefGuide-to-Genomics [https://perma.cc/F8KR-82L6] (last updated Aug. 27, 2015).
22. RNA is short for ribonucleic acid and functions as a “DNA photocopy” of a cell,
which can then be used for different tasks. What Is RNA?, RNA SOC’Y,
https://www.rnasociety.org/about/what-is-rna [https://perma.cc/Mt3V-EHW8].
23. Id. (stating that these “DNA photocop[ies]” help dictate this regulatory process);
see also GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF MED., HELP ME UNDERSTAND
GENETICS 74 (2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer [https://perma.cc/MSB5-X9R7].
24. GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, supra note 23, at 67 (explaining that proteins can
function as, among other things, antibodies against viruses and bacteria as well as
structural components that essentially “allow the body to move”).
25. Id. at 74; What Is RNA?, supra note 22.
26. GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, supra note 23, at 74.
27. See id.
28. See What Is Genome Editing?, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/policy-issues/what-is-Genome-Editing
[https://perma.cc/D2GC-UMYZ] (last updated Aug. 15, 2019).
29. Id.
30. One of the traditional methods of genetic modification, homologous
recombination, was inefficient because it had an extremely low rate of success that
could fall as low as a one-in-a-million chance of making a desired edit correctly. How
Does Genome Editing Work?, supra note 2. Another technique, zinc-finger nucleases
(ZFNs), proved troublesome because effectively designing, creating, and testing the
technique could take quite a long time. See Gupta & Musunuru, supra note 9, at 4154–
55 (estimating a one-year time frame for mice and stating that human cells proved to
be even more complex, which would lead to significantly prolonged scientific
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2.

The Discovery of CRISPR
In 2012, biochemist Jennifer Doudna and her bacteriologist
colleague Emmanuelle Charpentier published their landmark study
on a new genetic modification system called CRISPR.31 The publication
immediately sparked the biology community’s interest.32 George
Church, a professor at Harvard University, has gone so far as to state
that CRISPR “trumps just about anything” with respect to the
effectiveness and usability of gene editing tools.33 With such high
praise, it is no wonder that CRISPR’s use and presence in scientific
research has exploded since its discovery.34 Before discussing the
endless scientific opportunities that CRISPR presents, it is important
to understand why the technology is so groundbreaking that it was
described as potentially triggering “Sputnik 2.0.”35
experimentation). Additionally, both homologous recombination and ZFNs tended to
result in a “high rate of random,” off-target edits. Karen M. Vasquez et al., Manipulating
the Mammalian Genome by Homologous Recombination, 98 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8403,
8403 (2001). An off-target edit is when the DNA insert misses the region for desired
modification and instead occurs in a different portion of the genome, potentially
resulting in “permanent[] disrupt[ion of] normal gene function,” which can cause
undesired health complications. See Hanna R. Kempton & Lei S. Qi, When Genome Editing
Goes Off-Target, 364 SCI. 234, 234 (2019) (positing that the “specificity of gene editing
tools is critical to their utility, which is why off-target potential is a major concern”).
31. See, e.g., SIDDHARTHA MUKHERJEE, THE GENE: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 472 (2016);
JENNIFER A. DOUDNA & SAMUEL H. STERNBERG, A CRACK IN CREATION: GENE EDITING AND
THE UNTHINKABLE POWER TO CONTROL EVOLUTION xvi–xvii (2017).
32. MUKHERJEE, supra note 31, at 472.
33. Elizabeth Pennisi, The CRISPR Craze, 341 SCI. 833, 834 (2013).
34. See generally DOUDNA & STERNBERG, supra note 31, at 60–61 (explaining how
Jennifer Doudna and an international group of researchers pioneered studies of
CRISPR-Cas9’s development and its applications); YUVAL N. HARARI, HOMO DEUS: A
BRIEF HISTORY OF TOMORROW (2017); JAMIE METZL, HACKING DARWIN: GENETIC
ENGINEERING AND THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY 3–4 (2019) (arguing that the Homo
sapiens have moved beyond the point of “Darwinian evolution[‘s]” random mutations
and natural selection and progressed into a “self-designed” and “self-directed”
evolutionary process); MUKHERJEE, supra note 31, at 489 (explaining how CRISPRbased techniques have allowed scientists to do things that were “unimaginable in the
past,” leading us to a precipice in which “transgenic humans can be created”). However,
not all publications have had such a positive outlook on CRISPR’s capabilities. See Pete
Shanks, Pernicious Optimism and Selective Science: A Review of ‘Hacking Darwin’, CTR. GENETICS
& SOC’Y (May 31, 2019), https://www.geneticsandsociety.org/biopolitical-times/
pernicious-optimism-and-selective-science-review-hacking-darwin-jamie-metzl
[https://perma.cc/MP2S-ZAUZ] (criticizing Metzl’s book by stating that Metzl continually
uses “superficially plausible extrapolation” to speak in a technophilic and glib manner).
35. David Cyranoski, CRISPR Gene Editing Tested in a Person, 539 NATURE 479, 479
(2016) (quoting Carl June, an immunotherapy specialist at the University of
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CRISPR’s operation is best understood by breaking it into two
components. “CRISPR” is a short DNA sequence that provides a code to,
and then works in tandem with, RNA to guide and detect specific
sequences in the genome.36 Essentially, CRISPR provides a roadmap that
instructs a molecule on how to get to its ultimate destination. “Cas9” refers
to the protein that cuts the desired DNA site.37 These Cas9 proteins
virtually function like a pair of molecular scissors that cleave the targeted
locations in the genome.38 Although seemingly similar to some of its more
recent predecessors, CRISPR is superior in numerous ways.
To begin with, CRISPR has proven to be more precise, efficient, and
reliable than previous genome editing methods.39 Some researchers
found that CRISPR can be up to six times more efficient in successfully
making targeted genomic edits than its ZFN counterparts.40
Specifically, using CRISPR presents only a one–in–one–trillion chance
of making an off-target edit.41 This achievement in reliability is
monumental considering that only forty years prior, the success rate of
making an on-target edit was as low as one–in–one–million.42 In fact,
CRISPR is so precise that scientists analogize it to “a copyediting device
that scans sixty–six volumes of the Encyclopedia Britannica and finds,
erases, and changes one word, leaving all other words untouched.”43
This spectacular accuracy is especially important considering that, as
stated before, the human genome is comprised of three billion base

Pennsylvania, who argued that a “biomedical duel” between China and the United
States could be beneficial in rapidly improving CRISPR technology).
36. How Does Genome Editing Work?, supra note 2.
37. See id.
38. See Chauvin, supra note 6, at 304–05 & n.36.
39. What Are Genome Editing & CRISPR-Cas9?, supra note 7.
40. How Does Genome Editing Work?, supra note 2.
41. See Chauvin, supra note 6, at 306.
42. How Does Genome Editing Work?, supra note 2.
43. See MUKHERJEE, supra note 31, at 489 (“Between 2010 and 2014, a postdoctoral
researcher in my laboratory tried to introduce a defined genetic change into a cell line
using the standard gene-delivery viruses, but with little success. In 2015, having
switched to the new CRISPR-based technology, she engineered fourteen alterations of
genes in fourteen human genomes, including the genomes of human embryonic stem
cells, in six months—a feat unimaginable in the past.”); see also Tracey Tomlinson,
Note, A CRISPR Future for Gene-Editing Regulation: A Proposal for an Updated Biotechnology
Regulatory System in an Era of Human Genomic Editing, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 446
(2018) (explaining that scientists’ continual refining of CRISPR after its discovery led
to the technique’s high degree of accuracy).
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pairs and even a single error can result in serious diseases or death.44
The lowered probability of making off-target edits with CRISPR results
in a technology that scientists can use more safely and confidently.
Furthermore, because CRISPR can use numerous guide RNA in
tandem, it can target multiple sites at once.45 This adaptability to more
sites is a stark shift from using a single ZFN to target a single gene.46
Apart from improving efficiency by targeting multiple genes at once,
this new approach saves researchers a tremendous amount of money.47
Before the discovery of CRISPR, creating a single protein with previous
technologies could cost a research facility upwards of $1000.48 With this
new invention, scientists can produce guide RNA templates in a few
days with free software and a $65 DNA starter kit.49 CRISPR’s beneficial
components show that the technology is ultimately far easier to use,
faster to create and deploy, more reliable, and much less expensive.50
That CRISPR provides immense clinical possibilities for future
development bolsters these current achievements.
3.

CRISPR’s Revolutionary Applications to the Human Genome
The potential applications of CRISPR technology range from
therapeutics to diagnostics and, as previously discussed, to gene
editing.51 Through these applications, many scientists believe that
CRISPR could help “prevent, treat, or cure medical conditions or

44. Mark Shwartz, Target, Delete, Repair: CRISPR Is a Revolutionary Gene-Editing Tool, but
It’s Not Without Risk, STAN. MED., https://stanmed.stanford.edu/ 2018winter/CRISPR-forgene-editing-is-revolutionary-but-it-comes-with-risks.html [https://perma.cc/3GR7-24T5].
45. See, e.g., Gupta & Musunuru, supra note 9, at 4156–57; Itishree Kaushik et al.,
CRISPR-Cas9: A Multifaceted Therapeutic Strategy for Cancer Treatment, 96 SEMINARS CELL
& DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 4, 4 (2019).
46. How Does Genome Editing Work?, supra note 2.
47. See id. (pointing out that large genome projects “took many years and tens of
thousands of dollars” but could “now be completed at a small fraction of time and price”).
48. See Shwartz, supra note 44.
49. Id.
50. See Liting You et al., Advancements and Obstacles of CRISPR Cas9 Technology in
Transactional Research, 13 MOLECULAR THERAPY: METHODS & CLINICAL DEV. 359, 359–60,
366 (2019) (pointing out that CRISPR can play an important role in the “metadata
revolution” which includes “large scale analyses of genome sequences, deep sequencing
technologies, and single-cell transcriptomics”); How Does Genome Editing Work?, supra note 2.
51. Safikur Rahman et al., CRISPR/Cas: An Intriguing Genomic Editing Tool with
Prospects in Treating Neurodegenerative Diseases, 96 SEMINARS IN CELL & DEVELOPMENTAL
BIOLOGY 22, 28 (2019).
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disease[s],”52 like diabetes,53 malaria,54 and HIV.55 However, CRISPR
also possesses the potential to help those affected by inherited diseases
like Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy56 and certain neurogenerative
disorders.57 Furthermore, this new technology demonstrates the
potential to combat the growing problem of antibiotic resistance.58
While some of these feats may be out of reach for now, the therapeutic
possibilities have piqued the pharmaceutical industry’s interest,
“show[ing] a promising futuristic approach for treatment of human
diseases and inherited anomalies.”59 Even more groundbreaking, the
capabilities of CRISPR can affect future generations, extending far
beyond assisting or potentially curing only those who are alive today.

52. See GALLO ET AL., supra note 10, at 12.
53. See id. (explaining that by using CRISPR, researchers have developed a method
that uses a patient’s own insulin-producing cells, which reduced transplant rejection
risks and eliminated patients’ reliance on third-party donors for Type I diabetes).
Scientists maintain high hopes that this same process could work to help treat patients
with Type II diabetes. Id.
54. See id. at 12 (explaining that scientists are targeting Anopheles mosquitos, the
primary transmitters of this globally widespread and lethal disease, by attempting to
make them infertile, causing “all offspring [to] be[] male,” or by making the mosquitos
“resistant to the malaria parasite[s]”).
55. See Ormond et al., supra note 12, at 168. But see Stein, supra note 4 (claiming
that other “CRISPR pioneer[s]” like Feng Zhang and Jennifer Doudna have criticized
Dr. He’s experiments on Lulu and Nana because it “will likely render a person much
more susceptible for West Nile Virus” and because the technique of “washing the
sperm of infected sperm donors to eliminate HIV” is already an established, effective
alternative (internal quotations omitted)).
56. See GALLO ET AL., supra note 10, at 13–14 & n.50 (detailing how a Texas medical
center used the technique to repair dogs’ cells to produce dystrophin, a protein which the
genetic disorder prevents bodies from naturally creating). Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy
cripples the body and “leads to heart and respiratory muscle problems, and death.” Id. at 13.
57. See Rahman et al., supra note 51, at 24–26 (describing how CRISPR could be used
as a therapeutic application for Alzheimer’s, Parkinson, and Huntington’s disease).
58. See GALLO ET AL., supra note 10, at 14 (describing how the technique has been
used to effectively destroy harmful bacteria while avoiding bacteria that can be
beneficial to humans); Rob Stein, Scientists Modify Viruses with CRISPR to Create New
Weapon Against Superbugs, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 22, 2019, 5:01 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/05/22/723582726/scientistsmodify-viruses-with-crispr-to-create-new-weapon-against-superbugs
[https://perma.cc/26NL-44CP] (explaining how a doctor who specializes in treating
spinal cord injuries plans to research CRISPR technology and its applicability for
targeting increasingly antibiotic-resistant bacteria to help prevent bladder infections).
59. See Kaushik et al., supra note 45, at 8 (describing how CRISPR Therapeutics, Intellia
Therapeutics, and Editas Medicine are the three pioneers of the market and that Editas has
received upwards of $120 million from the tech billionaire Bill Gates as well as Google).
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The Congressional Research Service found that many studies are
being conducted around the world using both nonheritable and
heritable modifications.60 Nonheritable modifications are changes
made to a somatic cell—any cell other than an egg or sperm cell—that
do not result in genetic alterations to the modified individual’s
progeny.61 Significantly, researchers also used CRISPR to edit
reproductive cells in viable and non-viable embryos.62 These types of
edits do not only change the modified individual but also ensure that
his or her germline retains those changes and passes them to offspring
and future generations.63 This type of germline modification allows
scientists to alter the human embryo or gamete to remove or repair
any deleterious genes while making certain that future generations do
not inherit those diseases.64 CRISPR’s powerful capabilities, and its
premature use, make genetic watchdog groups leery of creating a
potentially unfair “society of genetic haves and have-nots.”65
Beyond prevention, treatment, and curing of diseases, CRISPR
enables scientists to enhance the human genome.66 That enhancement
could come in the form of changing someone’s eye or hair color,
making someone taller, or even raising someone’s IQ.67 Other
enhancements come in the form of selecting naturally occurring
mutations that could result in a heightened resistance to disease, bones

60. See GALLO ET AL., supra note 10, at 14–16 (pointing out multiple research
studies carried out in the United States and China—which are at the forefront of
CRISPR research—seek to manipulate heritable and nonheritable traits to combat
mutations that lead to illnesses like fatal blood disorders and Marfan Syndrome).
61. Id. at 14; see also Tomlinson, supra note 43, at 448 (stating that another reason
somatic cells are nonheritable is because of their uniqueness to each individual, which
results in their dying off with a person).
62. See also GALLO ET AL., supra note 10, at 14–16 (citing an international research
team that used “CRISPR in viable human embryos to correct a genetic defect” that was
one of the leading causes in young athletes’ sudden deaths).
63. Id. at 14; see Shwartz, supra note 44 (cautioning that an off-target genetic edit
could have “serious consequences” for descendants).
64. See generally GALLO ET AL., supra note 10, at 14–15; Shwartz, supra note 44.
65. See generally Stein, supra note 4 (describing concerns about a society where children
are modified for nonmedical reasons, such as to be “taller, stronger or smarter”).
66. See MUKHERJEE, supra note 31, at 477.
67. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., HUMAN GENOME EDITING: SCIENCE,
ETHICS, AND GOVERNANCE 137 (2017) (exploring genome editing to achieve
“enhancements,” which is “a term that itself is problematic”); Shwartz, supra note 44;
see also STEPHEN HAWKING, BRIEF ANSWERS TO THE BIG QUESTIONS 132 (2018) (positing
that qualities likely controlled by a larger number of genes, like intelligence and the
instinct of aggression, will be editable this century).
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that become so hard “they’ll break a surgical drill,” and modifications
that will help people “remain [mentally] sharp into old age.”68
However, if germline editing becomes commonplace, it could have
repercussions beyond one person’s well-being or that of their
offspring.69 Editing could result in long-term effects on people’s “life span,
identity, and economic output.”70 Additionally, gene modification using
CRISPR could raise serious societal issues if it is only available to the richest
people around the world or if it results in certain people’s genes becoming
“obsolete.”71 According to Stephen Hawking, when “superhumans” appear,
there will be significant political problems because unedited humans will
be unable to compete and could either “die out or become unimportant.”72
Unsurprisingly, the public has expressed general concern with human
germline editing because of the “slippery slope from disease-curing
applications toward uses with less compelling or even troubling
implications.”73 Under the Obama Administration, the Director of the
Office of Science and Technology Policy cautioned about CRISPR’s
unrestricted use,74 and its Director of National Intelligence warned of
CRISPR’s potential use to create weaponized biological agents.75
68. See Antonio Regalado, Engineering the Perfect Baby, 118 MIT TECH. REV. 27, 32 (2015).
69. See id. at 31.
70. Id.
71. See id. (stating that base price for in vitro fertilization hovers around $20,000
and rises to $100,000 if a parent utilizes additional services such as a surrogate mother,
an egg donation, or a genetic test); Robert Sparrow, Yesterday’s Child: How Gene Editing
for Enhancement Will Produce Obsolescence—and Why It Matters, 19 AM. J. BIOETHICS 6, 13
(2019) (arguing that technologically enhancing humans through genetic modification
will result in “yesterday’s child,” which he defines as a genetically obsolete child).
72. See HAWKING, supra note 66, at 132–33. (stating that some people will not be
able to resist genetically enhancing human DNA, regardless of laws banning such
practices, which will result in “a race of self-designing beings, who are improving
themselves at an ever-increasing rate”).
73. See MUKHERJEE, supra note 31, at 476.
74. Holdren, supra note 14 (warning that modifications in clinical settings are “a
line that should not be crossed” until an international summit explored potential
implications and alternatives that could derive the same benefits to patients while “not
requir[ing] germline alteration”).
75. See Tomlinson, supra note 43, at 449–50 (discussing the DNI’s concern that
CRISPR research “conducted by countries with different regulatory or ethical
standards than those of Western countries probably increases the risk of the creation
of potentially harmful biological agents or products” like “weaponized vectors, such as
mosquitos” that transmit diseases and toxins). However, the Congressional Research
Service stated that CRISPR is likely to play an integral role in developing
“countermeasures against both traditional and genetically engineered biological
weapons” because of its “dual-use nature.” GALLO ET AL., supra note 10, at 34.
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Furthermore, a large international consensus has stated that, at this time,
germline modification on humans would be “irresponsible.”76 Because of
this global concern, scientists who have used CRISPR on humans have been
widely criticized and reprimanded. The Chinese doctor who used CRISPR
to create Lulu and Nana received a three-year jail sentence and a $400,000
fine for violating his country’s ethical principles and regulations.77
All of these uncertainties associated with CRISPR’s use led Pulitzer Prizewinning author Siddhartha Mukherjee to opine on one of the central
questions that humans will have to answer when creating a framework for
genetic modification.78 He stated: “[t]he crux then is not genetic
emancipation (freedom from the bounds of hereditary illnesses), but genetic
enhancement (freedom from the current boundaries of form and fate
encoded by the human genome).”79
B. Caselaw Establishing Rights Related to CRISPR
The Fourteenth Amendment declares that “[n]o State shall . . .
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”80 From this Amendment, the Supreme Court extrapolated
substantive due process, equal protection, and procedural due process
rights.81 Substantive due process rights have historically protected
citizens from state intervention through two major avenues.
76. Genetic Modification, Genome Editing, & CRISPR, PERS. GENETICS EDUC. PROJECT,
http://pged.org/genetic-modification-genome-editing-and-crispr
[https://perma.cc/72Y4-BKXQ] (explaining that the US National Academies, the UK
Royal Academy, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences came to this consensus but that
they had not recommended banning the technique and instead wished research to
continue). Currently, a number of European countries and Canada have made it
illegal to use germline genome modification in clinical settings, and the United States
has banned all federal funding for its clinical application. Id.
77. Merrit Kennedy, Chinese Researcher Who Created Gene-Edited Babies Sentenced To 3 Years In
Prison, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 30, 2019, 01:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2019/12/30/792340177/chinese-researcher-who-created-gene-edited-babies-sentenced-to-3years-in-prison [https://perma.cc/8W34-YQ9L] (quoting the executive director of the Center
for Genetics and Society, Marcy Darnovsky, as having called Dr. He “reckless and self-serving”).
78. MUKHERJEE, supra note 31, at 477.
79. Id. (emphasis added) (pointing out that there was a very fine line betwixt
emancipation and enhancement but that it would be the “fragile pivot on which the
future of genome editing whirls”).
80. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
81. Anthony Miller, The Case for the Genetic Parent: Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, Lehr,
and Michael H. Revisited, 53 LOY. L. REV. 395, 400–02 (2007). A detailed analysis of
potential procedural due process and equal protection challenges to CRISPR is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
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The first avenue of protection derives from the Bill of Rights, which
the Court has incorporated almost in its entirety.82 Some of those rights
include the First Amendment’s free exercise of religion;83 the Fourth
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures;84
and, most recently, the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms.85
The second avenue has developed through the Court’s creation of
“general protection[s] against certain arbitrary, wrongful government
actions.”86 These protections include the right to personal privacy,87
the right to marriage,88 and the right for a woman to decide whether
to obtain an abortion.89 Through this second avenue, the Supreme
Court established a line of caselaw protecting parental and familyrelated rights.90 This use of the latter branch was necessary because
parental rights are not specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights and

82. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 953 (2019). The only Amendments that
have yet to be incorporated are the Third Amendment’s quartering of soldiers, the
Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial in civil suits, and the Eighth Amendment’s
protection against excessive fines. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 470 (19th ed. 2016).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)
(“The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment
embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.”).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“Since the
Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by
the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government.”).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. II; see McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780
(2010) (“It cannot be doubted that the right to bear arms was regarded as a substantive
guarantee, not a prohibition that could be ignored so long as the States legislated in
an evenhanded manner.”).
86. See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 953 (2019).
87. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“Various
guarantees [established through a number of amendments in the Bill of Rights] create
zones of privacy.”).
88. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (“[T]he right to marry
is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 12 (1967) (“Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of
another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”).
89. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy, whether it be
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty . . . or . . . in the
Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass
a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).
90. See Miller, supra note 81, at 400–02.
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instead needed to be “found somewhere between the lines” of the First
Amendment’s “Freedoms of Speech, Religion, and the Press.”91
Despite the fact that the Court has protected unenumerated rights
in the past, it has demonstrated a “hesit[ance] to extend the sphere of
fundamental rights.”92 Whether protecting enumerated rights or
extending protection beyond them, the Fourteenth Amendment is
typically subject to three standards of review. Strict scrutiny—the
highest standard—is applied to fundamental rights and requires a state
government to demonstrate a compelling state interest to which the
state’s ends are sufficiently narrowly tailored.93 Intermediate scrutiny
requires that government action be substantially related to furthering
an important governmental interest.94 Lastly, rational basis—the most
deferential standard—simply inquires whether government action
“pursues a legitimate end by rational means.”95 Most commonly, the
Court does not apply intermediate scrutiny to substantive due process
rights and instead applies rational basis review if it finds that a right is
not fundamental.96
While the parental and familial rights cases help provide some
insight into how the Court might view genetic modification, none of
the cases explicitly tackles the issue of a parent’s right to use germline

91. Eric V. Meeker, Comment, Termination of Parental Rights: Constitutional Rights,
State Interests and the Best Interest of the Child, 17 J. JUV. L. 82, 88–89 (1996) (stating that
freedom of speech, religion, and press can be asserted regardless of a person’s status
and that “[b]ased upon [parental rights’] conditional existence, it makes little sense
to accord these rights preference over all other competing [state] interests”).
92. See Nancy Pham, Choice v. Chance: The Constitutional Case for Regulating Human
Germline Genetic Modification, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 133, 141–42 (2006) (arguing
that the Supreme Court would be even less likely to find human germline genome
modification a fundamental right because it is such a new and different type of
reproductive technology).
93. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 929 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
94. Stephen G. Gilles, Parental (and Grandparental) Rights After Troxel v. Granville,
9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 69, 110–11 (2001) (explaining that “intermediate scrutiny
requires a moderately close fit between ends and means”).
95. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989); see also Pham, supra note 92,
at 142 (pointing out that rational basis review is a very deferential standard which
requires merely that the legislation is neither arbitrary nor irrational). The rational
basis standard is met even if the Court needs to “supply its own purpose to justify the
statute.” Id. (quoting Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate
Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 787 (1987)).
96. See Gilles, supra note 94, at 138–39.
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genome modification on a human embryo.97 One reason may be
because CRISPR, and genetic modification in general, are relatively
recent technologies.98 However, the advancement and innovation of
these techniques has been rapid and the issue is likely to end up before
the Court sooner rather than later.99
Due to the lack of legal precedents on point, and because current
parental rights jurisprudence leaves many unanswered questions,100 a
background of closely related substantive due process rights is
necessary. This Section begins by examining caselaw directly related to
parental and family rights. It then looks to other closely related or
analogous substantive due process rights created and protected by the
Court. Examining established rights from both of these perspectives
presents a more complete framework, shedding light on how the
Supreme Court and lower courts are likely to view the parental rights
to genetically modify embryos via CRISPR.
1.

Supreme Court jurisprudence of parental rights
In 1923, the Supreme Court decided its first case directly concerning
parental rights. In Meyer v. Nebraska,101 the Court held a Nebraska law
that prohibited teaching children in any language other than English
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.102 Justice McReynolds
reasoned that parents had a “natural duty” to provide their children with
an education and that seeking out an instructor of their choosing was well
“within the liberty of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”103 Therefore,
because Nebraska’s legislature attempted to materially interfere with

97. See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) (protecting
right to bear arms); Roe, 410 U.S. at 113, 153 (protecting right to abortion); Loving, 388
U.S. at 1, 12 (protecting right to marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86
(1965) (protecting right to the use of contraceptives as well as the right to personal privacy).
98. See Chauvin, supra note 6, at 304–05.
99. See Gupta & Musunuru, supra note 9, at 4154.
100. See Francis Barry McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of
Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REV. 975, 985 (1988) (emphasizing that one of those questions
was whether parental rights were, at the time, even “fundamental rights at all”); see also
Tandice Ossareh, Note, Would You Like Blue Eyes with That? A Fundamental Right to Genetic
Modification of Embryos, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 729, 744 (2017) (stating that “there are currently
no explicit restrictions governing genetic modification at the state or federal level”).
101. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
102. Id. at 403.
103. See id. at 400 (emphasizing that Americans have found education and knowledge “of
supreme importance” for a long time and therefore they “should be diligently promoted”).
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parents’ power to dictate their own children’s education, the Court
deemed the statute unconstitutional.104
Two years later, the Court relied on its Meyer precedent in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters105 to reaffirm constitutional parental rights while
striking down an Oregon statute requiring parents and guardians to
send their children to public school during the academic year.106 Pierce
affirmed Meyer’s central holding that a state could not “unreasonably
interfere[] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control.”107 Together,
Meyer and Pierce established that parents had a broad constitutional
right under the Fourteenth Amendment to raise and educate their
children as they saw fit, without undue interference from the state.108
However, after the Court established far-reaching parental rights to
raise a child as one wished, these rights eventually faced opposition. In
Michael H. v. Gerald D.,109 Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion narrowed the

104. Id. at 401, 403. But see Susan E. Lawrence, Substantive Due Process and Parental
Rights: From Meyer v. Nebraska to Troxel v. Granville, 8 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 71, 77 (2006)
(positing that Meyer only dealt with Fourteenth Amendment parental rights in a
peripheral manner and, even then, came up with an “ill-defined” right).
105. 268 U.S. 510 (1925); see Lawrence, supra note 104, at 78 (comparing the
Court’s Fourteenth Amendment analysis in the parental rights context in the Meyer
and Pierce decisions).
106. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530 (explaining that under the law that the Court deemed
unconstitutional, children would have to attend school in a district they lived in and
that failure to send one’s child to public school would be considered a misdemeanor).
107. Id. at 534–35. But see Lawrence, supra note 104, at 78 (arguing that Pierce, similar to
Meyer, had not established a clear “supremacy of a parental right to control children”).
108. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35.
109. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion). While Michael H. is a plurality opinion,
it carries more weight due to its concurring opinions. Justice Brennan and Justice
White wrote separate dissenting opinions, but Justice Scalia’s plurality was fully joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and garnered more support from the concurrences of
Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor, the latter of which Justice Kennedy joined. Id.
at 113, 132, 136, 157. Moreover, the Supreme Court and lower courts around the
country still rely on the case’s precedent, bolstering its weight. Compare Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 592–93 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Michael H. to argue
against the overruling of Bowers v. Hardwick), with Fowler v. Benson, 924 F.3d 247, 261
n.8 (6th Cir. 2019) (ruling that the suspension of a license did not implicate a
fundamental right because the “right of the indigent to drive—even in a car-bound
society where public transit may be woefully inadequate—is not a right rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people”), and Jaen v. Sessions, 899 F.3d 182, 184, 190
(2d Cir. 2018) (holding that Jaen acquired citizenship at birth because his father was
an American citizen and, like the father in Michael H., established parentage through
marriage and not a blood relationship).
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Court’s prior decisions in Myer and Pierce.110 The Court held that a
biological father, whom Justice Scalia referred to as an “adulterous natural
father,” was not denied any constitutional rights when the state refused to
legally declare him the father of his child.111 To warrant protection, the
“adulterous natural father[‘s]” right had to meet two specific
requirements.112 First, the right at issue had to be fundamental.113 Second,
the right had to be “traditionally protected by our society.”114 In other
words, the right had to be “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”115
The Court also expressed its openness to allow an exception if “on
any other basis [the right] ha[d] been accorded special protection.”116
Ultimately, the plurality found no special exception and concluded
that an “adulterous natural father[‘s]” relationship with his daughter
was not traditionally protected and, in fact, was one that “our traditions
have protected . . . against.”117 Consequently, the right contested in
Michael H. was not fundamental and the Court used rational basis
analysis to review the law infringing on it.118
The Court’s decision was not without criticism, as Justice Brennan
asserted that the addition of the traditionally protected interest
requirement turned the Due Process Clause into a “redundancy.”119

110. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122.
111. Id. at 113–14, 120, 130 (stating that Michael H., who was found to be Victoria
D.’s true father with 98.07% probability, could not attempt to petition the state to
“establish his paternity and right to visitation”).
112. Id. at 120, 122.
113. See id. at 122 (stating that “in isolation, [fundamental] is hard to objectify” in
and of itself and thus required further analysis).
114. See id. (explaining that the inclusion of this second prong was “an attempt to
limit and guide interpretation of the [Due Process] Clause”).
115. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). Justice Scalia
also asserted that case history had consistently shown a “solid recognition of the basic
values that underlie our society.” Id. at 122–23 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
116. Id. at 124.
117. Id. at 120, 124, 132.
118. Id. at 129–31; see also Gilles, supra note 94, at 138 (2001) (pointing out that the Court
has often limited its standard of review in substantive due process cases to a “choice . . .
between rational basis review and strict scrutiny, with intermediate scrutiny not an option”).
119. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140–41 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that this
“redundancy mocks those who, with care and purpose, wrote the Fourteenth
Amendment” and that the focus should be on interests that “society traditionally has
thought important (with or without protecting [those interests])”). Justice Brennan
goes on to state that construing the Fourteenth Amendment in Justice Scalia’s manner

1034

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1015

Justice Scalia rebutted that the Due Process Clause’s “purpose [was] to
prevent future generations from lightly casting aside important
traditional values—not to enable this Court to invent new ones.”120 By
holding that only traditionally protected societal rights would be
upheld, Justice Scalia sought to limit new rights from being created
simply due to a uniform societal or state consensus.121
After Michael H., more than a decade passed before the Supreme
Court heard another landmark case regarding parental rights.122 In
2000, the Supreme Court decided Troxel, the most recent case in the
parental rights lineage.123 In Troxel, the Court considered a
“ignores the kind of society in which our Constitution exists” because it disregards the
fact that we do not live in an “assimilative, homogeneous society, but a facilitative,
pluralistic one” where citizens tolerate other’s different practices to ensure that those
“same tolerant impulse[s] protect[] our own idiosyncrasies.” Id. at 141. Additionally,
Justice White argued that no prior cases made “the father’s rights . . . dependent on
the marital status of the mother or biological father” and that the Court had effectively
“rendered [Michael H.] a stranger to his child.” Id. at 157, 163 (White, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 122 n.2 (adding that “traditionally protected” did not necessarily mean
“an explicit constitutional provision or statutory guarantee, but it must at least
exclude . . . a societal tradition of enacting laws denying the interest”).
121. Id. at 126–27.
122. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (plurality opinion) (discussing
the history of parental rights between Meyer, Pierce, and Michael H. while citing
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982), Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 548 (1979), Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978),
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), and
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
123. See 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion); Lawrence, supra note 104, at 111
(positing that Troxel may be the “most bold parental rights case invoking Meyer”);
Miller, supra note 81, at 400–01 (stating that coupling the precedents from Meyer and
Troxel set a “remarkably clear and coherent statement of the basic rights of
parenthood”). Similar to the Court’s Michael H. decision, Justice O’Connor’s Troxel
opinion secured additional support from Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Ginsburg,
Justice Breyer, Justice Souter’s concurring opinion, and Justice Thomas’ concurring
opinion. 530 U.S. at 60, 75, 80. Additionally, even though Troxel is a plurality decision,
Supreme Court opinions consistently cite the case, and lower courts around the nation
still apply its precedent. Compare McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 863 (2010)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Troxel helped solidify the idea that the Due
Process Clause “provides heightened protection against government interference with
certain fundamental rights and liberty interests” (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65
(plurality opinion))), and Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2618 (2015) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (positing that the Troxel, among other cases, “articulated the
importance of history and tradition to the fundamental rights inquiry”), with In re
Marriage of Markuson, No. A19-0009, 2019 WL 4164899, at *1, *1, *3 (Minn. Ct. App.
Sept. 3, 2019) (affirming the denial of a mother’s motion to relocate her children 200
miles away from their father while citing Troxel), and In re Kingston A.B., No. M2018-
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Washington statute that allowed courts to grant visitation privileges to
grandparents even if the child’s parents did not want the grandparents
visiting the child.124 Justice O’Connor began by reciting a detailed
history of precedent and concluded that caselaw made it clear that “it
[could not] now be doubted” that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause protected a fundamental right of parents to make
decisions regarding the “care, custody, and control of their children.”125
The court found a fundamental right for parents to make decisions
regarding their children and held that the Washington statute at issue
infringed upon a mother’s constitutional parental rights.126
For Justice O’Connor, the crux of the case was that the Washington
statute allowed “any person” to petition for visitation at “any time,”
while not allowing any deference to the parents’ “determination of
[their child’s] best interests.”127 She stated that a court “must accord at
least some special weight” to a fit parent’s decisions when reviewing that
parent’s decision making.128 Because the lower courts had interfered with
the parents’ fundamental rights while giving them “no special weight at
all,” the courts had gone a step too far.129 Additionally, the Court
explained that “special factors” could have adequately justified the state’s
interference but found that the lower courts had failed to provide any

02164-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 3946095, at *1, *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2019) (stating
that “[a] parent’s right to the care and custody of her child is among the oldest of the
judicially recognized fundamental liberty interests” to reject a father and step-mother’s
petition for the termination of a natural mother’s parental rights).
124. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61–62 (plurality opinion).
125. Id. at 65–66 (pointing out that this parental liberty interest was arguably “the
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court”). But see id. at 91–
93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder dealt with “unenumerated
parental rights,” which have historically resulted in very fractured decisions and had very
little “stare decisis protection”). While Justice Scalia did not call for overruling those cases
(because it was not requested by either side), he urged the Court not to extend its
precedent to the current case and warned that doing so would “usher[] in a new regime
of judicially prescribed, and federally prescribed, family law.” Id. at 93.
126. See id. at 60 (plurality opinion).
127. Id. at 60, 68–69 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 70 (emphasis added). But see Lawrence, supra note 104, at 111–13
(criticizing Troxel as a “dangerous case” because Justice O’Connor’s opinion avoided
the difficult issues of third-parties—like a child’s grandparents—being important to
the child’s emotional support system while leaving the most vulnerable demographic
voiceless: minor children).
129. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69 (pointing out that the lower court had incorrectly
presumed the exact opposite).
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such factors in their reasoning.130 However, Justice O’Connor’s opinion
did not expand on what constitutes an adequate factor.131 Similar to
Michael H., the Troxel opinion was subject to a wide range of criticism from
the other Justices.132 In his very brief concurrence, Justice Thomas
pointed out that neither the plurality, Justice Souter’s concurring
opinion, nor Justice Kennedy’s dissent “articulate[d] the appropriate
standard of review” even though they all agreed that the interest at issue
was indeed a fundamental right.133
Troxel has spurred a range of scholarly commentary on its impact on
parental rights. Professor Stephen Gilles, an accomplished constitutional
law scholar, agreed with Justice Thomas’s observation that Justice
O’Connor’s opinion never stated the level of scrutiny to which the specific
case should be subjected.134 The vagueness left from the Troxel decision—
deciding between giving adequate “special weight” to parental decisions
and protecting parents’ fundamental due process rights—led Gilles to
argue that future courts and Justices could argue for “any level of
scrutiny.”135 In the end, he argued that the most persuasive interpretation
of Troxel calls for the use of intermediate scrutiny,136 not rational basis

130. Id. at 68.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 80–81 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that denying certiorari would
have been a better decision considering all that needed to be done was for the
legislature to “draft a better statute”); id. at 91, 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (positing that
federal judges are not in a better position to make decisions affecting families than
state legislatures and that legislatures are “able to correct their mistakes in a flash” and
are “removable by the people” for making such mistakes); id. at 93–94, 102 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the lower court’s conclusion “that the best interests of the
child standard is never appropriate in third-party visitation cases” and arguing that the
question of whether the visitation statute was constitutional should have first been
addressed at the state court level).
133. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that he would have applied a
strict scrutiny standard and that the State of Washington failed to show “even a
legitimate governmental interest” by questioning a fit parent’s choices). Justice
Thomas also insinuates that the Court’s prior “substantive due process cases were
wrongly decided and that the original understanding of the Due Process Clause
precludes judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights under that constitutional
provision,” but that the issue had not been raised by either party in the case. Id.
134. Gilles, supra note 94, at 123 (clarifying that one could infer whether rational
basis review, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny was necessary by carefully
dissecting Justice O’Connor’s opinion).
135. Id. at 124–25.
136. Id. at 125–26.
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review137 or strict scrutiny.138 Additionally, he argued that Troxel can, and
should, be used in a manner that “extends beyond the context of
visitation.”139 Notably, others have pointed out that while the Court
repeatedly recognized parental rights in Meyer, Pierce, and Troxel, those
rights are not absolute.140 Even though there exists a “private realm of
family life which the state cannot enter,”141 a state is within its authority to
regulate and infringe upon parental rights “to protect the health and/or
well-being of children.”142
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s case-by-case approach to developing
fundamental parental rights resulted in “a patchwork of decisions that
leave[s] many questions unanswered.”143 A brief discussion of closely
related substantive due process rights established by the Supreme
Court will provide a more robust framework.
2.

Substantive due process rights closely related to parental interests
While many rights closely related to parental rights could affect the
constitutionality of CRISPR’s use, this Comment focuses solely on
those rights that might generate the strongest arguments to allow
genetic modification via CRISPR. Those rights include the general
right to personal privacy and the right to procreation and bodily
autonomy. While these rights do not encompass all possible rights that
could arguably protect the technique’s use, the protections afforded
under these rights are most closely analogous to genetic modification.
137. Id. at 125. Gilles states rational basis review was unreasonable for two reasons.
First, the standard tended to be deferential to the government, unless a specific
government decision was wholly irrational. Id. That was not the case in Troxel, as the
government had identified multiple rational benefits the children obtained from
visitations. Id. Second, giving “special weight” to parental decisions intrudes on the
discretion of the court “far more than rational-basis scrutiny would.” Id. at 124–25.
138. Id. at 125–26 (explaining that this “parental presumption” leaves an
opportunity for a court to override a parent’s decision while not actually finding any
harm to a child, which would be inconsistent with strict scrutiny because a state
claiming a compelling interest without any actual harm to the child seems
implausible). Additionally, Gilles points out that while Justice Thomas advocated strict
scrutiny, three Justices explicitly rejected its use. Id.
139. See also id. at 123, 142 (arguing that parental right jurisprudence would benefit
from integrating more of a cost-benefit analysis).
140. Grant H. Frazier, Comment, Defusing A Ticking Time Bomb: The Complicated
Considerations Underlying Compulsory Human Genetic Editing, 10 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH.
L.J. 39, 72 (2019).
141. Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
142. Id.
143. See McCarthy, supra note 100, at 985.
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One of the seminal cases that built the foundation for the rights
mentioned above resulted from a coalescence of Amendments. In
Griswold v. Connecticut,144 Justice Douglas established an implied right
to personal privacy through a “penumbra” of guarantees derived from
the Bill of Rights.145 This “zone[] of privacy” extended its protections
to marital relationships because they were seen as “a bilateral loyalty,
not commercial or social projects.”146 Eventually, the Court’s
protection of privacy interests split into two distinct branches: a right
to “avoid[] disclosure of personal matters” and a right to
“independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”147 The
second branch of privacy, and the potential basis for a fundamental
right to parental use of gene editing, was established in Roe v. Wade148
and will be discussed later in this Section.149
Courts have used Justice Douglas’s “penumbral” privacy analysis to
expand privacy rights beyond the traditional marital relationship. In
Eisenstadt v. Baird,150 the Court heavily relied on Griswold’s penumbral
privacy right to strike down a Massachusetts statute that prohibited the
distribution of contraceptives to anyone other than married couples.151
More importantly, Justice Brennan clarified in dicta that, while
Griswold protected marital privacy rights, those rights extended beyond
that relationship alone.152 He stated that “[i]f the right of privacy

144. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
145. See id. at 481–86 (holding that a Connecticut statute forbidding contraceptive
use violated the marital privacy that this “penumbra” guaranteed and therefore was
unconstitutional); see also Christine Guest, Comment, DNA and Law Enforcement: How the Use
of Open Source DNA Databases Violates Privacy Rights, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1015, 1035 (2019)
(explaining how Griswold’s right to privacy came from a combination of the First
Amendment, Third Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Ninth Amendment, and how the
Court used the Fourteenth Amendment to “apply this right of privacy to the states”).
146. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86.
147. See Guest, supra note 145, at 1035–36 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
599–600 (1977)).
148. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
149. See infra notes 155–60 and accompanying text; see also Guest, supra note 145, at
1036 n.144.
150. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
151. Id. at 440–41, 450, 452–53 (striking down the Massachusetts statute on equal
protection grounds because it had a “de minimis effect” on preventing fornication, its
health concerns were merely a pretextual reason to prevent premarital sex, and it
unreasonably discriminated between married couples and unmarried individuals).
152. Id. at 453 (positing that a marital relationship is not simply one entity that
thinks on its own, but “an association of two individuals each with a separate
intellectual and emotional makeup”).
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means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.”153 Justice Brennan’s expansion of Griswold’s penumbral
privacy rights from a marital relationship to the individual, including
the declaration that the decision of whether to “bear or beget a child”
was a personal decision, extended the realm of substantive due process
rights even further.154
Despite the previous cases’ focus on individual rights to privacy from
government intrusion, Eisenstadt’s dicta spurred a line of cases
debating a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy. The Supreme
Court dealt with the issue of terminating a pregnancy for the first time
in Roe v. Wade.155 The majority explained the history of abortion,
societal and organizational views on the issue, and substantive due
process rights, concluding that the idea of personal liberty was
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment and was “broad enough to
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.”156 However, the Court stated that this right was not
absolute and that states maintained an important interest “in
safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in
protecting potential life.”157 Therefore, not all pregnancy-related
decisions fell squarely within the “protected sphere of liberty,”158 and a
number of courts had already upheld state laws that protected a
mother’s “health or prenatal life.”159 Furthermore, in response to the
claim that a fetus was a “person” in the context of the Fourteenth

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 410 U.S. 113, 120, 164–66 (1973) (creating a trimester framework that
balanced the mother’s interest and the state’s interest while discussing the levels of
regulation/intrusion allowed in each).
156. Id. at 130–47, 153.
157. Id. at 154 (claiming that “[t]he Court has refused to recognize an unlimited
right of this kind in the past” in response to amici assertions that the absolute “right to
do with one’s body as one pleases” should extend to the privacy rights contested).
158. See Pham, supra note 92, at 141 (quoting John B. Attanasio, The Constitutionality
of Regulating Human Genetic Engineering: Where Procreative Liberty and Equal Opportunity
Collide, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1274, 1287 (1986)).
159. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156 (leading the court to find “State’s determinations” in these
matters “dominant and constitutionally justifiable”).
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Amendment, the Court found that no amendment to the Constitution
had “any possible pre-natal application.”160
After Roe established this broad right to terminate a pregnancy,
states took it upon themselves to narrow its holding.161 In Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,162 the Court ruled on
another landmark abortion case.163 Justice O’Connor unequivocally
affirmed Roe’s central holding that a woman was within her
constitutional rights when determining whether to terminate her own
pregnancy.164 This determination was more than just a right to make
one’s own procreative choices, but also encompassed the rights to
“personal autonomy and bodily integrity.”165 Nonetheless, the Court
declared that a state could regulate that right so long as the state did not
impose an “undue burden” on a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion.166
Additionally, a woman’s right was not unlimited, and a state could have
an interest in protecting the “life of the unborn” from the outset.167
Collectively, these cases demonstrate that parents have an
established right to decide how their child is cared for, who cares for
their child, and most other decisions regarding that child’s upbringing.
That right remains protected so long as the defined right is engrained
in the minds of people and traditions of society, making it

160. Id. at 157 (clarifying that nearly all occurrences of the word “person” in the
Constitution could only be understood to apply postnatally).
161. See generally Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989)
(upholding a Missouri statute that prohibited “public employees and facilities” from
performing or aiding in “nontherapeutic abortions”); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 466
(1977) (upholding a Connecticut regulation that limited Medicaid funding to
“medically necessary” abortions during the first trimester).
162. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
163. Id. at 844, 887, 897–99 (applying an undue burden test to uphold a
Pennsylvania statute’s definition of medical emergency, an informed consent
requirement, a parental consent condition, and a twenty-four-hour waiting period
while striking down a spousal notice requirement).
164. Id. at 871 (“[The right to terminate a pregnancy] is a rule of law and a
component of liberty we cannot renounce.”).
165. Id. at 857; see Pham, supra note 92, at 139.
166. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 873, 876 (rejecting Roe’s trimester framework in favor of
the undue burden test that hinged on when a fetus was determined to be viable). The
Court decided to draw a line at viability for two main reasons. First, because stare
decisis dictated that Roe, which the Court had reaffirmed twice, had shown to be a
“reasoned statement, elaborated with great care.” Id. at 870. Second, because viability
had proven to be the point in time when the fetus had a realistic chance of
“maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb.” Id.
167. Id. at 869.
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fundamental.168 Because parents are often found to have the best
interest of their children in mind, reviewing courts should give
parents’ decisions special weight.169 The cases concerning personal
privacy add to this sphere of rights by creating a zone of privacy that
protects married couples’ relationships from government intrusion.170
Courts further expanded this idea by establishing a level of individual
autonomy people have when making certain types of important
decisions, including whether or not to terminate a pregnancy.171 The
right to terminate a pregnancy, while broad, includes exceptions for a
state’s interest in protecting the health of the mother, maintaining
current medical standards, and protecting prenatal life.172 However,
courts will strike down any statutory intrusion as unconstitutional if the
state places an undue burden on a woman’s right to obtain an abortion.173
Taken together, all of these rights still leave one question unanswered:
do parents have a constitutional right to use CRISPR technology or
other genetic modification techniques to permanently modify embryos
and, consequently, future generations? Part II of this Comment
addresses the substantive due process doctrine discussed above in the
context of parents asserting their constitutional right to genetically
modify an embryo, either to fix an ailment or to enhance their future
child, via the use of CRISPR technology.
II. ANALYSIS
As discussed above, germline genome modification through CRISPR
enables parents to make child-rearing decisions, the effects of which
reach far beyond the child they contemplate raising. Because germline
genome modification via CRISPR is not a fundamental right under
substantive due process doctrine, it should not be subject to strict
scrutiny. This Section first explores both broadly and narrowly defined
rights that parents could assert when attempting to make genetic
modifications, showing that a narrow definition would be more
appropriate in this context.174 Next, this Section describes how CRISPR
technology exceeds the scope of both Meyer’s and Pierce’s holdings.175
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 156 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 157–59 and accompanying text.
See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.1.
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Using the Supreme Court’s analysis in Michael H., this Section shows
courts are not likely to protect germline editing using CRISPR as a
fundamentally protected right.176 Additionally, this Section explains that
the most recent parental rights case, Troxel, calls for courts to give
parental decisions special consideration and apply intermediate scrutiny
when considering laws restricting the right to genetically modify
embryos.177 Moreover, this Section explains and responds to arguments
calling for either strict scrutiny or rational-basis review standards,
concluding that intermediate scrutiny is the most applicable standard.178
Finally, this Section considers the potential application of intermediate
scrutiny and contemplates states’ interests in barring CRISPR’s use
along with parental interests in choosing to use the technique.179
A. CRISPR Genome Editing as a Narrowly Defined Right
Before analogizing CRISPR to previously established rights or
analyzing what standard of review a court may apply, it is crucial to
define the explicit right a parent would attempt to assert under these
circumstances. Some of the precedential parental rights cases could
lead to arguments that a broader reading should be used. Together,
Meyer and Pierce created a broad right that parents could “direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control.”180 Later,
Troxel summarized the right and stated that “the care, custody, and
control of their children” were well within the purview of parental
interests.181 However, as previously addressed, that is not exactly what
would occur if parents attempted to genetically modify an embryo.182
If a parent successfully modified an embryo’s germline, the edit would
not only affect their soon-to-be child but all of the child’s descendants
as well.183 Therefore, using CRISPR to edit an embryo’s DNA has
intergenerational repercussions and is much more expansive than only
having “control of their children.”184 Moreover, closely related rights
could also be used to argue for a broader reading.
176. See infra Section II.B.2.
177. See infra Section II.B.3.
178. See infra Sections II.C.1–3.
179. See infra Sections II.C.4.
180. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
181. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion).
182. See supra notes 60–79.
183. What Are Genome Editing & CRISPR-Cas9?, supra note 7.
184. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (emphasis added); see supra Section I.B.1.
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Taken as a whole, Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, and Casey created a personal
privacy right that extends to decisions regarding reproductive matters like
whether to terminate a pregnancy.185 However, asserting the “right to
make decisions regarding reproduction” has been deemed a “somewhat
disingenuous classification” because genetic modification of an embryo is
“radically different from traditional reproduction.”186 In addition,
precluding a parent from genetically modifying an embryo through
CRISPR would not intrude or impose an undue burden upon a woman’s
right to terminate her pregnancy. A constitutional right to “bear or beget
a child” is vastly different from “being able to use genetic manipulation to
create a child according to one’s own preferences.”187 Thus, because
neither established parental rights nor established related rights provide
properly framed interests, a narrower reading of the parental right
being asserted is more appropriate.
When defining the right to modify an embryo’s genes, the inclusion
of its generational effects is a much more accurate way to portray the
interests that parents would be asserting. When contemplating human
germline genome modification (HGGM), one writer succinctly stated
that the right could be described as “the right to choose the genetic or
physical characteristics of one’s child using alternate reproductive
technology.”188 However, at the time that article was written, CRISPR
had not been invented and the possibility of actually making permanent,
targeted changes to DNA was not a reality. Since the publication of that
article, CRISPR has enabled parents to change the DNA of their
children and future generations.189 Therefore, for the purposes of this
analysis, the asserted right will be defined as the right to make
permanent, heritable alterations to the genetic makeup of one’s child.

185. See supra Section I.B.2.
186. See Pham, supra note 92, at 140 (arguing that human germline genome
modification should not be a fundamental right because it is not a traditional form of
reproduction). But see Ossareh, supra note 100, at 757 (claiming that genetic
modification could be protected under Lawrence’s broadly defined privacy right
because the Court “avoided such particular language” to “define[] the protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment”).
187. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Pham, supra note 92, at 138.
188. See Pham, supra note 92, a 140 (clarifying that the Court could still find that
definition of human germline genome modification to be fundamental).
189. See Shwartz, supra note 44.
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B. CRISPR Modification in Light of Established Parental Rights
To gain a better understanding of what level of scrutiny the Supreme
Court and lower courts should apply when dealing with parental
attempts to use CRISPR modification, the following Section will
analogize the asserted right described above to established caselaw.
Ultimately, because CRISPR genome editing does not fit neatly into
any of the historically protected rights, a different standard from that
applied in the following cases is required.
1.

Genetic modification is broader than Meyer’s & Pierce’s Rulings
The first parental rights cases, Meyer and Pierce, were decided in 1923
and 1925, respectively, and did not cover the topic of genetic editing.190
Together, Meyer and Pierce created precedent that a state cannot
“unreasonably interfere[] with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control.”191 These cases affirmatively created rights to raise children,
but, as mentioned previously, permanently editing the DNA of a child
is certainly much broader than the Meyer and Pierce Courts even
fathomed.192 Arguing that a parent could modify the genetics of a
future embryo when the Court spoke directly to the “upbringing and
education” of a child would be quite a stretch.193 Additionally, parents
would not only be modifying their future child’s DNA but they would
effectively be permanently changing future generations’ DNA.194
Consequently, the ability to affect the way in which future generations
of one’s lineage are created or brought up must fall outside the
purview of the rights that the Meyer and Pierce Courts considered.195

190. See generally Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
191. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35.
192. See supra Section I.B.1.
193. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35; see supra Section I.B.1.
194. See Shwartz, supra note 44.
195. But see Ossareh, supra note 100, at 756 (arguing that Meyer does give parents
the right to genetically modify their children because modification techniques would
“allow[] parents to make choices about how to establish a home and bring up
children” (internal quotations omitted)). Ossareh goes on to claim that a combination
of parental and procreative rights is sufficient to protect the right to genetically modify
a child and “obviat[e] the need to demand a separate right to genetic modification.”
Id. at 757.
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2.

CRISPR embryo modification cannot be “ranked as fundamental”
Under Michael H.’s more recent ruling, modifying embryos through
CRISPR would likely not fall within the recognized, constitutionally
protected fundamental rights of parents. Michael H. established that an
asserted right must be both fundamental and one that is “traditionally
protected” to be upheld.196 CRISPR technology, and genetic modification
generally, have only existed for approximately forty years.197 As a result, it
is unlikely that this technology is old enough to be “so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”198
In fact, multiple Pew Research surveys have found that most people are
currently against the use of CRISPR in embryos.199 Additionally, due to the
current lack of caselaw even mentioning genetic modification, it would be
extreme difficulty to argue that the technology is traditionally protected.200
Furthermore, the Court is unlikely to make an exception for CRISPR
because, much like the interest of the adulterous father in Michael H.,
there is no evidence that CRISPR “has been accorded special
protection” under any other circumstances.201 Justice Scalia even stated that
the right in Michael H. was one that “our traditions have protected . . .
against.”202 Because the scientific community is still largely unaware of
CRISPR’s long-term repercussions, its use on human DNA has “long been
considered off-limits,” and many have been quite critical of those who have
used it.203 Moreover, Justice Scalia stated that the “purpose [of the Due
Process Clause] is to prevent future generations from lightly casting aside

196. Michael H. v Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989).
197. See How Does Genome Editing Work?, supra note 2.
198. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122.
199. See, e.g., Cary Funk & Meg Hefferon, Public Views of Gene Editing for Babies Depend
on How it Would Be Used, PEW RES. CTR. (July 26, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/
science/2018/07/26/public-views-of-gene-editing-for-babies-depend-on-how-it-wouldbe-used [https://perma.cc/7D33-ZR7Z] (finding that 65% of adult Americans believe
that “gene editing would involve testing on human embryos” and that this would take
technology too far); David Masci, Many Americans are Wary of Using Gene Editing for
Human Enhancement, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2016/08/26/many-americans-are-wary-of-using-gene-editing-for-humanenhancement [https://perma.cc/TP8S-DHT5] (finding that over 68% of U.S. adults
are “very” to “somewhat” worried about genetically modifying babies).
200. See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
201. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124.
202. Id.
203. See Stein, supra note 4 (pointing out that the Center for Genetics and Society’s
executive director called its use in human twins an “unethical and reckless
experimentation on human beings, and a grave abuse of human rights”).
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important traditional values—not to enable this Court to invent new
ones.”204 CRISPR is a new technology that enables parents to edit the
genome of embryos, and, consequently, it may impact future generations
and their lineage, which is exactly what Justice Scalia cautioned against.205
Because of its potentially far-reaching, intergenerational implications,
courts should be wary of extending special protection to this nascent
technique. As a result, CRISPR’s use would likely not be a fundamental
right and would only be subject to rational basis review, if not for Troxel.
3.

Parental rights uncertainty after Troxel
After assuming that the genetic modification of an embryo is not a
fundamental right under Michael H., one still needs to consider the
significance of Troxel.206 Justice O’Connor stated that parents have an
unequivocal right to make decisions regarding the “care, custody, and
control of their children.”207 Similar to the Meyer and Pierce rights discussed
above, applying Troxel’s determination to CRISPR would extend far beyond
the “care, custody, and control of their children” because CRISPR has
permanent intergenerational implications.208 Additionally, Troxel’s special
weight could result in courts finding that parents get deferential treatment
in decisions regarding whether to genetically modify embryos, so long as
they have their child’s best interest in mind.209 According to Troxel, parents
get the benefit of the doubt because, taken as a whole, they tend to have in
mind their child’s best interest when making decisions.210
However, granting parents a special weight in decision making
without first considering whether the asserted right is fundamental
would disregard Michael H.’s precedent. Justice O’Connor did briefly
mention that any “special factors” given by a state could provide
adequate justification for infringing on parental rights.211 While the
Court never specifically enumerated exactly what some of those “special
factors” could be, CRISPR, given its relative newness and potentially
serious repercussions, arguably constitutes one such limiting factor.212

204. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122 n.2.
205. See Shwartz, supra note 44.
206. See Lawrence, supra note 104, at 111 (highlighting various questions that arise
when examining Troxel’s interpretation of Meyer).
207. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion).
208. Id. (emphasis added); Shwartz, supra note 44.
209. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 2, 130 and accompanying text.
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The Troxel Court’s finding that the state should accord special weight to
parental decisions creates tension with Michael H. because it pushes back
on Michael H.’s “traditionally protected” rights analysis. While the Court
traditionally selects between strict scrutiny and rational basis standards
of review when deciding substantive due process cases, another option
remains available: intermediate scrutiny.
C. A Call for Intermediate Scrutiny
Troxel’s decision resulted in uncertainty for the parental rights
analysis. Should courts automatically decide in the parents’ favor
because of a special weight? How should the Michael H. analysis factor
into a court’s decision making? Most importantly, among strict
scrutiny, rational basis, and intermediate scrutiny, what standard
should courts apply? The following analysis will consider the potential
application of all three standards of review in turn.
1.

Michael H. invalidates the application of strict scrutiny
As discussed above, the Supreme Court is not likely to find that
parents have a fundamental right to use CRISPR to modify a human
embryo. If the Court found such a fundamental right, the Court would
apply strict scrutiny during judicial review of laws infringing on that
right, and a state government would need to prove a compelling state
interest to which the state’s ends were narrowly tailored.213 However,
the Supreme Court has historically “been hesitant to extend the sphere
of fundamental rights.”214 Considering that reluctance, the Court is even
less likely to extend heightened protection to an advanced, nascent
technology that has tremendous social and legal repercussions.
Furthermore, fundamental protection is unfounded because Troxel’s
“parental presumption” preserves an opportunity for a court to override
a parent’s decision without actually finding any harm to a child.215
Accordingly, this line of reasoning is inconsistent with strict scrutiny
because a state claiming a compelling interest without any actual harm

213. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 929 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
214. See Pham, supra note 92, at 142.
215. See Gilles, supra note 94, at 125–26.
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to the child seems implausible.216 Lastly, while Justice Thomas advocated
for strict scrutiny in Troxel, three Justices essentially rejected its use.217
On the other hand, others have argued that procreative, parental,
and privacy rights all suggest the use of strict scrutiny.218 They state that
allowing genetic modification will “enhance procreative liberty” and
that “part of the fundamental good of having a child is getting to raise
a healthy, happy child.”219 This line of reasoning is problematic for two
reasons. First, it fails to contemplate that genetic manipulation affects
more than just the birth of one child.220 Second, the analysis fails to
consider recent parental rights cases when it makes these judgments
on parental rights. One note arguing for strict scrutiny only briefly
mentions Michael H.’s precedent in a footnote and ignores mention of
Troxel altogether.221 As stated earlier, both of these cases significantly affect
how courts view parents’ constitutional rights and must be taken into
consideration.222 Accordingly, a court’s application of strict scrutiny in this
context would be inappropriate.
2.

Rational basis standard of review is improper after Troxel
Traditionally, a court would proceed to apply rational basis review if it
found that a substantive due process right was not fundamental.223 Under
216. Id. at 125–26 & n.153 (explaining the actual “harm” to the child as involving
“large, serious, potentially irreparable reductions in the child’s welfare”).
217. Id. at 125–26. The three Justices who rejected strict scrutiny are Justice Scalia,
Justice Stevens, and Justice Kennedy. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80, 91, 93 (2000).
While Justice Scalia rejected to apply it because he did not believe the interest at issue
was an enumerated right at all, Justice Kennedy and Justice Stevens “rejected a ‘harmto-the-child’ requirement, rather than squarely rejecting strict scrutiny by name.” See
id. at 93; Gilles, supra note 94, at 125 n.152.
218. See, e.g., Ossareh, supra note 100, at 756, 759 (stating that “choosing a future
child’s genetics implicates one’s role as both a parent and a procreator”).
219. Id. at 756 (positing that because other choices regarding procreation are
broadly categorized as procreative rights, “the choice to genetically modify an embryo
fits snugly in the intersection of both of these doctrines”).
220. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
221. See Ossareh, supra note 100, at 754 n.148.
222. See supra Section I.B.1.
223. See Gilles, supra note 94, at 138–39. While some scholars have mentioned the
Court’s “rational basis with bite” jurisprudence that was limited in Board of Trustees
v. Garrett, this line of reasoning can be distinguished from potential CRISPR
substantive due process claims. Pham, supra note 92, at 146 (analyzing substantive due
process rights in the context of human germline genome modification and not
mentioning intermediate scrutiny but mentioning “rational basis with bite” and
Lawrence’s liberty interest analysis); see Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366
(2001) (reaffirming that intellectual disability does not qualify as a “quasi-suspect”
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rational basis review, a court would ask whether a state’s legislation “pursues
a legitimate end by rational means.”224 While analysis under Michael H.
would result in applying a rational basis test, a reading of Troxel shows that
the Court cannot apply this test when considering CRISPR’s use. Giving a
“special weight” to parents was controlling in Troxel even when the state
provided rational reasons for enacting the statute at issue.225
Professor Gilles posits that this rationale argues for intermediate scrutiny
and refutes the application of rational basis for two reasons.226 First, a court
using rational basis review usually defers to the government, unless the
court finds that a specific decision “as a whole is not irrational.”227 This was
not the case in Troxel, as the government had identified multiple benefits
that children had derived from the statute.228 Second, the “special weight”
that Justice O’Connor gave the parental decisions intruded on the
discretion of the court “far more than rational-basis scrutiny would.”229 As a
result, Troxel’s “special weight” consideration determined that rational basis
review is not the proper standard of review for parental rights.
3.

Intermediate scrutiny: A proper standard of review
Due to the confusion caused by these conflicting precedents and the
Troxel plurality’s failure to explicitly mention a standard of review, the
most persuasive interpretation of Troxel calls for courts to apply an
intermediate scrutiny standard when considering laws infringing on
parental rights to use CRISPR to genetically modify embryos.230 For a law
to withstand intermediate scrutiny, it must be substantially related to

classification for equal protection claims (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985))). Garrett specifically dealt with Eleventh
Amendment and intellectual disability distinctions as applied to the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Id. Therefore, while people with
intellectual disabilities are not deemed a quasi-suspect class, the issue of whether
CRISPR’s use could be subject to this level of scrutiny is still open for debate.
224. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989).
225. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 61–62 (2000) (plurality opinion).
226. See Gilles, supra note 94, at 125.
227. See id. (pointing out that “two overnight visits per month” could not possibly
be “irrational” when the parent in Troxel had previously agreed that “one daytime visit
per month was appropriate”).
228. See id. (pointing out that the government had cited benefits that children
obtained from a relationship with their grandparents and taking into account that
there was no open conflict between the parent and grandparents).
229. Id.
230. See id. at 125–26.
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furthering an important governmental interest.231 As previously
mentioned, some may argue that the Court does not use intermediate
scrutiny in cases regarding substantive due process.”232 However, Troxel’s
inability to explicitly provide a standard of review left the door open for
future courts to argue for “any level of scrutiny.”233 Additionally, as some
scholars have identified, it has “become increasingly clear that
intermediate scrutiny is also an appropriate option in substantive due
process cases.”234 In fact, the Court seems to favor intermediate scrutiny
with cases concerning “parental childrearing rights in particular.”235
Furthermore, expansion from visitation rights and child rearing to
genetic modification is proper. Scholars have argued that Troxel’s
precedent could “extend[] beyond the context of visitation.”236
Intermediate scrutiny could account for the uncertainty between
Michael H.’s and Troxel’s precedents. By applying intermediate scrutiny
to parents’ rights to use CRISPR modifications, a court would be able
to account for both Michael H.’s “traditionally protected” analysis and
Troxel’s “special weight” consideration.237
4.

Potential application of intermediate scrutiny
When applying intermediate scrutiny, a court would first look to a
state’s regulation on CRISPR and determine whether the state was
acting in furtherance of an important governmental interest.238 In the
case of CRISPR modification, state governments are likely to assert a
few different interests to justify its regulation. For example, the
government could establish valid interests in “maintaining medical

231. Id. at 110–11 (explaining that “intermediate scrutiny requires a moderately
close fit between ends and means”); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976)
(applying intermediate scrutiny to gender-based discrimination).
232. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
233. See Gilles, supra note 94, at 124–25.
234. Id. at 138–39, 139 n.195 (pointing to Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey’s undue burden standard, Stanley v. Illinois’s means-ends analysis,
analogizing to the Fourth Amendment’s privacy “reasonableness” balancing test, and
finally looking to Justices Souter, Kennedy, and Scalia’s opinions in Troxel, all
mentioning parental upbringing rights as having First Amendment undertones, which
sometimes applies intermediate scrutiny).
235. Id. at 112 (pointing out that the Court’s preference toward intermediate
scrutiny is a trend with substantive due process rights in general).
236. Id. at 123.
237. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000) (plurality opinion); Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (plurality opinion).
238. See Gilles, supra note 94, at 110–11.
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standards” or “protecting potential life” outlined in Roe.239 As stated
earlier, the medical field came to a consensus long ago that genetic
editing resulting in intergenerational genetic manipulations is
“considered off-limits.”240 This consensus could serve as an argument
that the government is simply attempting to “maintain[] medical
standards.”241 Additionally, the government could argue that
regulating CRISPR’s use was a method by which it could “protect[]
potential life” given the unknown, and potentially dangerous,
repercussions of using the technology.242
The government may also argue a need to expand its interest to
encompass the general welfare of society altogether.243 Because
CRISPR can be used to modify an embryo to make a child smarter,
taller, or stronger for nonmedical purposes, scientists have worried
about opening the floodgates to the creation of “designer babies.”244
The proliferation of genetic modification could lead to what the
executive director of the Center for Genetics and Society called “a
society of genetic haves and have-nots,” where only those that can
afford genetic modification can reap its benefits, potentially rendering
others’ genetics obsolete.245 Additionally, the government has an
important interest in preventing the potential long term effects that
CRISPR modification could have on society’s “identity[] and economic
output.”246 Lastly, the government would need to prove that the
legislation passed was substantially related to its goal of preventing
CRISPR’s use, while not being over- or under-inclusive.247 To do this

239. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
240. Stein, supra note 4.
241. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154; Stein, supra note 4.
242. Roe, 410 U.S. at 120; see Stein, supra note 4 (noting that the scientific
community worries “that a mistake could introduce a new disease that could be passed
down for generations”).
243. Some have pushed back against this idea, arguing that larger societal concerns
like the “unknown effects on the future gene pool,” the potential “homogeniz[ation
of] the population over time in a discriminatory manner,” and the worry “that only the
very wealthy will have access to these technologies,” are all “not sufficiently compelling
to justify state action.” See Ossareh, supra note 100, at 763–65. However, even Ossareh
concedes that “parent[s] seek[ing] to harm his or her child by intentionally modifying
that child to have clearly outrageous traits” would constitute a sufficient state interest
to bar genetic modification. Id. at 766.
244. Stein, supra note 4.
245. Id.; see also Sparrow, supra note 71, at 13.
246. Regalado, supra note 68, at 31.
247. Gilles, supra note 94, at 110–11.
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effectively, a state could explicitly mention CRISPR in the statute or
identify heritable genetic modifications as the scope of the legislation,
ensuring that no reproductive, parental, or personal privacy rights are
violated when regulating CRISPR’s use.
If parents attempted to challenge the legitimacy of the state’s interest in
regulating their rights to modify an embryo or argued that parental rights
outweighed the government’s interests, a court could look to established
exceptions available to states. For example, the Supreme Court found that
states are within their authority to regulate and infringe upon parental
rights “to protect the health and/or well-being of children.”248 Because
the potentially dangerous repercussions of germline editing are
unknown, the government would have a strong argument for protecting
the health of a potential life.
Furthermore, when CRISPR technology is more advanced and widely
accepted, intermediate scrutiny would be flexible enough to allow for
parents or state governments to argue for its use to help prevent diseases
and potentially save lives. The adaptability of this standard is significant
because “[s]omeday we may consider it unethical not to use germline
editing to alleviate human suffering.”249 Another established exception a
reviewing court could use comes from Troxel’s “special factors” that a state
could use to justify its interference upon parents’ rights.250 While the Court
did not enumerate exactly what those factors could be, a reviewing court
could—and should—determine that CRISPR is the exact type of factor the
Court had in mind.251 CRISPR is new and exciting, revolutionary, and
provides endless opportunities for human evolution, but it also comes with
many uncertainties that cannot be granted fundamental protection.
CONCLUSION
CRISPR technology developed rapidly and gave scientists the
remarkable ability to make targeted, effective, and permanent edits to
the human genome’s germline.252 Given the technology’s superiority
and success compared to previous techniques, it will not be long before
parents are making the decision of whether they want to modify the

248. Frazier, supra note 140, at 72; see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (stating that a woman’s right was not absolute, and that a
state’s interest could include protecting the “life of the unborn” from the outset).
249. See DOUDNA & STERNBERG, supra note 31, at xix.
250. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (plurality opinion).
251. Id.
252. What Is Genome Editing?, supra note 28.
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DNA of a potential child. While the parental desire to make a child as
fit for the world as possible is understandable, CRISPR’s immense
powers must be used with caution and need to be reined in by the law.
While Meyer and Pierce first established a substantive parental right
“to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control,”253 CRISPR germline modifications extend beyond the Court’s
holdings because germline edits carry with them intergenerational
consequences.254 The uncertainty of these ramifications led the Obama
Administration to warn the scientific community about germline
editing’s unrestricted use and its possible long-term dangers.255
Additionally, those that have used the science on embryos have been
subjected to serious backlash.256
If a parent’s right to use CRISPR technology on embryos is found to
be a fundamental right, it will be protected under the highest scrutiny
available for substantive due process rights. However, under Michael
H.’s precedent, CRISPR modifications cannot constitute fundamental
parental rights because genetic modification of embryos has not been
a traditionally-protected right.257 The decision to grant CRISPR a
fundamental classification would run contrary to most of the scientific
community’s call for limited use of CRISPR.258 Even one of the
pioneers of the technique, Jennifer Doudna, essentially called for a
moratorium on its clinical use in humans because the technology,
while an extreme improvement over its predecessors, “occasionally
cuts the genome at unintended sites.”259
253. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
254. See What Are Genome Editing & CRISPR-Cas9?, supra note 7.
255. See Holdren, supra note 14.
256. Rob Stein, A Russian Biologist Wants to Create More Gene-Edited Babies, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (June 21, 2019, 5:08 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/
2019/06/21/733782145 [https://perma.cc/7N4N-A7XZ] (explaining how a Russian
scientist’s desire to genetically modify embryos using CRISPR technology has been
criticized as “premature, unethical and irresponsible”).
257. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (plurality opinion).
258. Genetic Modification, Genome Editing, & CRISPR, PERS. GENETICS EDUC. PROJECT,
http://pged.org/genetic-modification-genome-editing-and-crispr
[https://perma.cc/72Y4-BKXQ].
259. See Nicholas Wade, Scientists Seek Ban on Method of Editing the Human Genome,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/20/science/
biologists-call-for-halt-to-gene-editing-technique-in-humans.html (describing two
schools of thought on human germline genome modification: one which is more
practical and attempts to “balance benefit and risk” while the other “sets up inherent
limits on how much humankind should alter nature”); see also DOUDNA & STERNBERG,
supra note 31, at 211 (clarifying that the words “ban” and “moratorium” were explicitly
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To make matters more complicated, Troxel’s decision at the turn of
the century called the status of parental rights into question. Troxel
held that a “special weight” needed to be given to parental decisions,
which competed against Michael H.’s traditionally protected test.260
This confusion left the door open for judges, courts, and parents to
fight for “any level of scrutiny” when arguing the extent of parental
rights.261 Ultimately, when considering the narrow yet powerful right
to make permanent, heritable alterations to the genetic makeup of one’s
child, intermediate scrutiny is the most appropriate standard of review
because it accommodates both Michael H.’s and Troxel’s precedents
while giving courts flexibility in governing decisions that have the
power to “direct the evolution of our own species.”262

avoided but that “the message was clear: for the time being, such clinical applications
should be off-limits”). Regardless of Doudna’s warnings, clinical trials using CRISPR
started in 2016 and continue today, including a more recently approved clinical trial
that focuses on modifying “therapeutic human hemopoietic stem cells . . . to treat
thalassemia.” You et al., supra note 50, at 359.
260. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000) (plurality opinion).
261. Gilles, supra note 94, at 124–25.
262. See DOUDNA & STERNBERG, supra note 31, at xvi.

